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cultural integration and combined capabilities. This essay will examine organizational culture as it applies to the military and provide a historical perspective of the relationship between these two services to include current operations in southwest Asia. It will also examine the cultural styles and doctrinal origin of each service and present methods of preserving and building on recent joint success.
Organizational Culture
Utilizing social psychologist Edgar Schein's model, we find that organizational culture consists of three distinct levels: artifacts, values and norms, and assumptions and beliefs. 
Subcultural Interaction in the Military
Subcultural interaction within a parent organization is measured by the cooperation and complimentary efforts of its subcultures. Disorganized subcultures with no interaction are least mature, and are alienated from the rest of the group. As subcultures synchronize within a culture, they morph from diverse-fragmented , to diverse-differentiated, to diverse-integrated subcultures. 5 If subcultures combine to form a perfectly homogeneous culture, Schein refers to that domain as a unitary culture. An ideal end-state culture for joint military forces would be one in which diverse-integrated service subcultures form a force characterized by unique and highly trained services melded efficiently into a single organization with no seams or gaps between services.
Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, it is fair to say that U. Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain basic principles regarding the use of air power…..Two adjacent HQs will provide the associated military and air commanders with the best opportunity of working together successfully. Physical proximity by itself will not produce the answer, unless it carries with it close individual contacts, a constant exchange of information and a frank interchange of views. Operation ANACONDA's complexity started with pressure to root out and capture high value al-Qaeda targets who had possibly escaped from Coalition attacks on the Tora Bora cave complex on 9 Dec 2001 into the Khowst-Gardez region. As described by a USAF air support operations squadron (ASOS) commander attached to support special operations forces, the initial plan was a special operations mission which mirrored previous Operation ENDURING FREEDOM initiatives. "Like Tora Bora, bomb the living heck out of it for four or five days, as long as it took, and then slowly tighten the noose on it." 21 The plan for Operation ANACONDA, however, expanded to incorporate "more boots on the ground" and was becoming a "complex conventional and special forces operation." Had we known this was going to go on, we would have stood up a full ASOC (air support operations center) and moved (the people) to Bagram a week or two weeks ahead of this and then conducted a set of rehearsals with carriers, with the bombers, with the whole thing. And I would have forward-deployed the A-10s so you would have had indigenous quick-reactions. 30 General Hagenbeck began Operation ANACONDA with no organic artillery (only mortars,) no direct dialogue with his Air Force counterpart, and an immature air support and control system before running into an enemy well beyond Army expectations. General Hagenbeck later argued that he "didn't consider bringing in 105s (105mm howitzers) because I knew we could accomplish the mission without them," adding "it was clear we could capitalize on our mortars as well as Army, Air Force, Marine and Navy aviation assets." 31 For instance, despite the fact that only three of the eight Apache helicopters remained combat capable after their first action, he claimed their contributions were "extraordinary" and labeled them "the most effective close air support asset we had…hands down." 34 As for Naval and Marine air contributions, he stressed their willingness to "fly as low to the ground as they could"
and characterized their fighter pilots as "terrific." 35 As for the Air Force, General Hagenbeck complained of the initial airspace management problem and said, "We have a huge procedural and training issue we've got to work through with our Air Force friends." 36 As one F-15E crew member who flew in support of ANACONDA ground forces later stated, "All this planning for a 1,500-man operation and the Army couldn't pick up the phone and make a call." 37 Although records are small in number and sometimes incomplete, actual results reflect both timely responses to requests and increased pre-planned strikes after the first two days of the operation by all component assets. Coalition aircraft delivered an average of more than 250 bombs per day into an area one-sixteenth the size of an Operation DESERT STORM-era killbox (ground grid reference system used to coordinate air-ground operations.) 38 Eight Americans died during the operation and 80 more were wounded. There was one incident of friendly fire when an AC-130 mistakenly engaged a friendly convoy early in the operation. Overall, in that 8 by 8 square mile area, there were 42 enlisted terminal attack controllers guiding munitions onto 800 to 1,000 enemy while 1,500 American and Afghan forces fought on the ground. 39 As
General Tommy R. Franks, then Commander, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated, "Operation ANACONDA sought to clear the enemy in that valley area and in those hills and succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not been able to get that done." 40 From a joint perspective, however, service-centric blinders certainly inhibited a more efficient operation and, quite possibly, more favorable results. A preliminary CENTCOM report provided an initial assessment:
Although the airpower resource always exceeded the claimant's requirement, the stovepipe nature of the command and control system put the claimants in competition for these available resources, sometimes during execution, and placed strains on the air control element's ability to distribute fires in accordance with the CJTF Mountain Commander's guidance. Despite the in-execution leap in requirements for air strikes, CAS was responsive and pivotal to the ultimate success. 41 Service leaders, especially in the Air Force, responded quickly to quell the post-operation rift caused by General Hagenbeck's public comments, but the cultural damage was done.
Despite past lessons and the legislated joint emersion of U.S. military officers, this experience in
Afghanistan indicated that U.S. forces had neither mastered the fundamentals of air-ground coordination so eloquently emphasized by Coningham 60 years earlier nor had it achieved a critical objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to crush service firewalls.
In the aftermath of Operation ANACONDA, tactical and operational fallout had marked effects in improving joint combat planning and capabilities for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. [Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life-but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud. 45 The Soldier sees the Air Force as a means of getting him there and assisting him in the goal of taking and holding ground. Service strategy takes a back seat to tactics and operations in the Army because it is simply not needed. As opposed to the Air Force approach of explaining the tenets of air power and their joint application in its basic doctrine, this quote from Army doctrine reflects the Army's fundamental culture and delineates the "attitudes and values" of these two services:
The Army serves the Nation. We defend America's Constitution and our way of life. We protect America's security and our Nation's interests. We answer the Nation's call to serve whenever and wherever required." We must prepare for decisive action in all operations. But above all, we are ready to fight and win the Nation's wars-our nonnegotiable contract with the American people. The Army is, and will remain, the preeminent land warfighting force in the world. We serve as the ultimate guarantor of our way of life. regardless of service, for the entire battlespace using a system inherent to the tenets of air and space power and responsive to both deliberate and reactive timelines. Airmen integrate their weapons systems with others to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. While air power is apportioned throughout a theater to assure tenets are maintained, execution is planned, executed and assessed through a centralized joint element.
Integration of land elements has been slower in coming and is characterized more by synchronization than integration. The Army and Marine Corps focus more on tactical level organization with tactical objectives in areas of operation which form subsets of the broader joint operating area. 47 As surface forces achieve tactical objectives, results aggregate to produce operational and strategic-level effects. 48 Their approach toward planning and integration, however, is normally joint only if other services are needed to help achieve those tactical Army's organizational behavior has been more retroactively than inherently joint. 55 Gravitating to its doctrinal pole, the Army often approaches problems from a strictly land-based perspective, and then applies the Army solution to joint warfare. 56 More Soldiers and Airmen now have joint experience than ever before and their direct interaction in Iraq while securing joint operating locations, coordinating strike and reconnaissance for ground initiatives and executing convoy operations is unprecedented. Nevertheless, this momentum will dissipate unless there is a deliberate effort to improve joint procurement, institutionalize joint training and a renewed service chief approach to missions not along traditional service lines, but with a joint expeditionary mindset. This will establish Army-Air Force subcultures squarely in the diverseintegrated relationship desired for joint operations.
In February 2000, the Center for Strategic and International Studies surveyed over 12,000 uniformed personnel at over 32 worldwide locations. In assessing military culture, the study recognized steady progress in joint integration through the 1990s while providing suggestions for further improvement. Specifically, the study proposed introducing cadets and young officers to other service cultures early in their training trees, capitalizing on the fact that they are free of deep service-specific assumptions and that they possess inherent potential for building the mechanisms and mindsets for effective joint interaction. The study also recommends greater emphasis on each service culture at senior service and staff colleges, to include historical reviews and analysis of how service cultures affect joint operations. 57 Conversely, survey results highlight the importance of service cultures "essential to cohesion and combat within their own domains." 58 Service chiefs can drive cultural integration through institutional changes in both tactical and professional training. Furthermore, they can regularly nurture that integration by what U.S. Army Major General David A. Fastabend in his monograph on Army culture, would label a "born joint" approach to issues historically service-centered. 59 The approach yields long range benefits while preserving unique service-specific expertise and traditions. Finally, senior officers must refrain from parochial, sometimes misinformed public critiques of joint operations. Deficient joint performance reflects failure within service subcultures to prepare its leaders for the inevitable joint battlespace. Twenty years after
Goldwater-Nichols, inter-service training prior to combat and genuinely joint perspectives to both planning and execution in war are well within reach of any general officer. Joint success depends on the effective, adaptive interaction of strong service subcultures. Exaggerating the value or impact of land or air forces at the expense of their combined effect is toxic to joint culture.
Distinct yet fully integrated service subcultures provide the joint military environment an ideal force for meeting future strategic objectives. If joint operations are to achieve their full synergistic potential, Soldiers and Airmen versed in their own cultures must understand and be prepared for the operating environment imposed by the cultures of their sister services.
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